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1.
their

Do

pension

plaintiffs
benefits

have

such

vested

that

a

contract

subsequent

rights

to

legislative

enactment may not impair those rights?
ACTION OF THE COURT BELOW
This case was presented

on stipulated

facts to the

Honorable Jay E. Banks, Judge of the Third Judicial District
Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

After reviewing the

stipulated facts, hearing additional evidence and argument of
counsel, Judge Banks entered

a decree permanently

enjoining

defendants from applying or attempting to apply a 1985 amendment to the Utah Public Safety Retirement Act to plaintiffs in
order to eliminate, postpone or reduce payment of plaintiffs1
retirement

benefits

(R102-1Q3).

Defendants

thereafter

filed

their Notice of Appeal from Judge Banks1 decree (R184).

Respondents raised several additional issues below which
the lower court found unnecessary to decide because of its
ruling on the breach of contract question. Respondents argued
below that application of a subsequent amendment to divest them
of their pension benefits also violated a statutory prohibition
against retroactive legislation, as well as due process and
equal protection provisions of the Utah State Constitution.
Since the lower court's ruling should be affirmed, it is
unnecessary for this Court to reach those additional issues.
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STATUTES SUBJECT TO INTERPRETATION
Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-1, as enacted L. 1969, ch. 127, § 1:
49-11-1. Short title
known and may be cited
Act. It shall include
engaged full time in
forth.

of act—Scope. This act shall be
as the Utah Public Safety Retirement
in its coverage all public employees
public safety work, as herein set

Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-1, as amended L. 1983, ch. 215, § 1:
49-11-1. Short title of act—Scope. This act shall be
known and may be cited as the Utah Public Safety Retirement
Act. It shall include in its coverage all public employees
engaged full time in public safety work, as herein set
forth, except a public employee serving as the commissioner
of public safety, or as the elected or appointed sheriff or
chief of police of a public safety organization, if that
public employee files a formal written request seeking
exclusion from coverage.
Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-1, as amended L. 1985, ch. 255, § 2:
49-11-1. Short title—Scope. This act is known as the
Utah Public Safety Retirement Act. It shall include in its
coverage all public employees engaged full time in public
safety work under this chapter, except a public employee
serving as the commissioner of public safety, or as the
elected or appointed sheriff or chief of police of a public
safety organization, if that public employee files a formal
written request seeking exclusion from coverage, but the
public employee cannot continue employment in the same
covered employer unit and receive payment from the retirement office at the same time.
Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-8(19), as amended L. 1983, ch, 224,
§ 10 and L. 1985, ch. 174, § 1:
(19) "Service" or "covered service" means "public safety
service" rendered to an employer for compensation which is
included in computations relating to membership status or
benefit rights under this act. In no case may a retirement
allowance or other benefit be granted under this act which
is based upon the same service as has been or will be the
basis for retirement benefits under some other Utah public
retirement system.
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Utah Code Ann, S 49-11-8(30) , as amended L. 1985, ch. 174,
§ 1:
(30)
"Retirement" means withdrawal from active
with a retirement allowance granted under this act,

service

Utah Code Ann, § 49-11-34, as amended L. 1983, ch. 218, § 2:
49-11-34, Service retirement—Application for allowance—
Requirements for early retirement. Any member who qualifies for service retirement may retire by making written
application therefor to the retirement office and stating
the proposed effective date of retirement which shall not
be more than ninety days subsequent to the date of application nor less than thirty days after notification of
intention to retire has been given to the employer.
The member is qualified to retire upon termination of
services on or before the effective date of retirement if
one of the following requirements is met:
(a)

The member has been credited with at least 20 years of
service.

(b)

The member has been credited with at least ten years
of service and has attained an age of 60 year or more.

(c)

The member has been credited with at least four years
of service and has attained an age of 65 years or more.

Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-37, as amended L. 1975, ch. 147, § 5:
49-11-37. Re-employment in public service after retirement—Effect on allowance.
If a retired member is
re-employed full time in a position covered by this system
he shall immediately notify the administrator who shall
either suspend the said retirant's allowance or cancel the
retired member's retirement subject to the following:
If the member has been on retirement one year and the new
employment may extend for one or more years the administrator shall cancel the retirement and reinstate the retired
member to active status with the same service credit which
he had standing on his record at the time he last retired.
He shall then begin participating again as a member of the
system and accrue additional service credits.
If the member has been on retirement less than a year or
the new employment probably will last less than a year in
the opinion of the retirant, then the pension part of the
retirant's allowance shall be suspended for the duration of
such employment.
-3-

STATEMENT OF THE CASS
1.
sheriffs

and

The

Plaintiffs/Respondents,

chiefs

of

police

Plaintiffs

("police

chiefs")

of

are
public

safety organizations in the State of Utah and are members of
the

Utah

Public

Safety

Retirement

System.

They

employers regularly and continuously contributed
Public Safety Retirement Fund and

and

their

to the Utah

its predecessor

funds for

periods ranging from 11 years to 35 years up to the time of
their

withdrawal

from

the

system

(R105

at

1! 2).

In 1983,

plaintiffs were given the option by statute to withdraw from
coverage under the state's Public Safety Retirement System and
to

continue

safety

their

employment

organizations.

with

their

Plaintiffs opted

to

respective
so exclude

public
them-

selves from coverage and continue their employment.
2.

The

Defendants/Appellants.

Defendants

are

responsible for administration of the Public Safety Retirement
System.

Defendants contend that pursuant to a 1985 amendment,

sheriffs and police chiefs are no longer able to exclude themselves from coverage under the system and remain employed with
their same public safety organization.

Defendants attempted to

apply this amendment to plaintiffs by demanding that plaintiffs
elect between retirement from their present positions or forfeiture of their vested pension benefits.
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3.

The 1969 Retirement Act,

The Utah Public Safety

Retirement Act (the "Act"), Utah Code Ann, 5 49-11-1, et seq. ,
was enacted in 1969 for the purpose of providing, inter alia, a
means whereby public safety employees, their employers and the
State

of Utah

could

provide

employees

and their

dependents

economic protection upon retirement, disability or death (R105
at 11 2). The Act establishes a comprehensive scheme of retirement benefits to be administered by the executive officer of
the Utah State Retirement Board ("Retirement Board"), through
the

Utah

State

Retirement

Office

("Retirement

Office"),

pursuant to regulations promulgated by the Retirement Board.
4.
amended

The

in 1983

1983

Amendment.

("1983 Amendment")

The

Retirement

to permit

Act

was

sheriffs and

chiefs of police to request exemption from coverage under the
Act (R105 an 11 3). The Retirement Office subsequently advised
plaintiffs they could, pursuant to the 1983 Amendment, exempt
themselves

from

coverage

under

the Retirement

Act, receive

retirement benefits if qualified, and continue in their present
employment (R105 at 11 4). The Retirement Office set forth the
official interpretation and policy of the Retirement Board with
respect to the effect of the 1983 Amendment in a letter dated
May

23, 1983 (R106 at % 5) .

This policy was communicated,

either orally or in writing, to each plaintiff (R106 at 11 5).
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Each plaintiff thereafter requested exemption from the
Act

by completing

Each

plaintiff's

Retirement
dates

of

for

provided

request

Board
their

qualified

a form

(R106

the Retirement

Office.

for

exemption was approved by the
2
f1[ 6-7).
As of the respective

at

exemptions
service

by

from

the

retirement,

Act, each
having

plaintiff

met

all

was

statutory

requirements (R106 at % 9 ) .
Plaintiffs
retirement

subsequently

by completing

made

forms provided

State Retirement Office (R106 at 11 10).
respective

applications

application

for

service

to them

for
by

service
the

Utah

Upon approval of their
retirement,

plaintiffs

became "retirants" under the Act (i.e., a retired member of the
Utah Public Safety Retirement System who was receiving retirement benefits)
tiff's

(R107 at 1[ 12).

application

for

service

Upon approval
retirement,

of each plainthe

Retirement

Office calculated the dollar amount of each plaintiff's retirement allowance, said amount being calculated in accordance with
the formula set forth in the Retirement *ct (R107 at n 13).
The dollar amount of plaintiff's respective retirement
allowances was fixed as of the effective date of their retirement and does not change except for a statutorily allowed

z

Although two of the plaintiffs were denied approval of
service retirement by the Retirement Board because the 1983
Amendment was passed prior to their requests for exemption,
defendants have agreed to treat all plaintiffs uniformly for
purposes of this case (Rpt. Transcript at pp. 3-4.).
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cost-of-living
plaintiff's

adjustment

retirement

(R107

at

allowance

% 14).

Payment

of

each

has been made by the Utah

State Retirement Office regularly and without interruption each
month since the respective date of each plaintiff's retirement
(R107 at U 15). As of the commencement of retirement payments
by the Retirement

Office, each plaintiff

had

satisfied

all

legal conditions necessary to retire and receive benefits (R107
at 1 16) .
Plaintiffs have made no employee contribution to the
Utah Public Safety Retirement

Fund

respective service retirements.

since the date of their

Moreover, plaintiffs' respec-

tive employers have made no contribution on behalf of plaintiffs to the fund since the date of their respective service
retirements.

Plaintiffs have received no service credits for

continued employment after the date of their respective service
retirements (R108 at 1111 17-19).
5.
amended

the

The 1985 Amendment.
Retirement

Act

in

The Utah State Legislature
1985

("1985

Amendment")

to

provide that a sheriff or police chief who requests exemption
from coverage under the Act may not continue employment in the
same covered employer unit and receive retirement benefits at
the same time (R108 at H 20). Plaintiffs were then advised by
the Retirement Office that they must either
present

employment

or

payment

-7-

of

their

terminate their

monthly

retirement

allowance would be stopped.

Plaintiffs were also advised by

the Retirement Office that they may withdraw their request for
exemption (R108 at %% 21-22).3
SUMMARY OP THE ARGUMENT
Pension

statutes

create

a

between the state and the pensioner.

contractual

relationship

Thus, when the pensioner

has satisfied all conditions precedent, the state is bound to
perform the contract on the terms and conditions existing at
the time the contract is formed.

Retirement benefits vest by

satisfying the all conditions precedent and may not be altered
by subsequent legislation.
Plaintiffs here had a vested contract right to receipt
of

their

retirement

benefits

on

the

terms

and

conditions

existing at the time they withdrew from the State's Retirement
System.

The State offered to pay retirement benefits to plain-

tiffs who satisfied certain conditions regarding retirement and
exempted

themselves

from

the Retirement

System.

Plaintiffs

accepted this offer by satisfying those conditions and withdrawing from the Retirement System pursuant to the 1983 Amendment.

Plaintiffs thereafter received retirement benefits and

^The parties stipulated to certain facts and the Court
entered findings of fact with respect to each specific plaintiff. These plaintiff specific facts are set forth in detail
in the Court's Findings of Fact and need not be reiterated here
(see R109-134).
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continued their present employment, but did
accumulate
behalf

by

benefits,

service

credits

their

respective

including

employment, vested

the

or

not continue to

contributions
employers.

right

to

made

Thus,

continue

on

their

plaintiffs'

their

present

as of the respective dates they withdrew

from the Retirement System and could not thereafter be impaired
by subsequent legislative enactments.
The

legislative

history

of

the

1983

Amendment

is

irrelevant here since it is well established that even curative
statutes may not impair vested rights.

Moreover, the legis-

lative history itself is inconclusive and there is no evidence
chat the 1985 Amendment was intended to cure a misinterpretation

of

the

1983

Amendment.

Neither

of

those

amendments

repeals by implication any other provision of Title 49, Chapter
11.
Finally, although vested rights may be altered under
very limited circumstances, such circumstances are not present
here.

Defendants have not shown that plaintiffs, by exercising

their rights here, have jeopardized the actuarial soundness of
the state's Retirement
have not provided

System.

More

plaintiffs with

the

importantly, defendants
required

"substantial

substitute" for their vested pension benefits, but rather have
given plaintiffs a Hobson's choice between retirement benefits
or continued employment, not a substitute for retirement benefits and continued employment—to which plaintiffs are entitled
under the 1983 Amendment.
-9-

ARGUMENT
I.
THIS CASE PRESENTS NO NOVEL ISSUES OF LAW.
A CLEAR, UNEQUIVOCAL AND SUBSTANTIAL BODY OF
CASE LAW CONCERNING THE RIGHTS OF PUBLIC
PENSIONERS HAS PREVIOUSLY BEEN DEVELOPED BY
THIS COURT. PLAINTIFFS' RIGHT TO RECEIVE
PENSION BENEFITS WHILE REMAINING EMPLOYED
VESTED AT THE TIME THE RETIREMENT BOARD
APPROVED PLAINTIFFS WITHDRAWAL FROM THE
RETIREMENT SYSTEM,
Defendants concede that vested retirement benefits may
not be altered by subsequent legislation.

(Appellant's Brief

at p. 7). Defendants contend, however, that plaintiffs' right
to receive pension benefits while remaining employed did not
ripen into a vested contract right which could not be altered
or amended by subsequent legislative action.

jld.

This argu-

ment misconstrues the nature of plaintiffs' constitutional and
contractual rights.
A contractual

relationship

arose

between

plaintiffs

and the State of Utah at the time plaintiffs withdrew from the
Retirement System.

In 1983, the State offered to pay retire-

ment benefits for life to those sheriffs and police chiefs who
(a) satisfied certain terms and conditions existing at the time
(such as minimum service time), (b) exempted themselves from
the Retirement
benefits.

System, and

(c) made

application

to receive

Plaintiffs accepted this offer by (a) completing the

necessary "years of service" and other conditions, (b) exempting

themselves

from

the Retirement

-10-

System

(thus

forfeiting

their right to earn further service credit and pension benefits), and (c) making application to receive their benefits.
The Retirement Office performed this contract by determining
the

fixed

beginning

amount

of

to make

benefits

lifetime

due

monthly

each

plaintiff

payments

and

by

to plaintiffs.

Thus, plaintiffs' benefits vested on the terms and conditions
existing at the time they became
from the system.

"retirants" by withdrawing

Defendants could not unilaterally alter this

offer once accepted.
Defendants made

regular monthly

benefit payments to

plaintiffs for a period of almost two years before threatening
to stop all further payments unless plaintiffs terminated from
their

present

existing

employment.

employment

a

clear

that

of

and

accepted by

Pension Statutes Create A Contractual
Between The State And The Pensioner.

Relationship

it was made

condition

forfeiture
the

offer when

not

is

of

retirement

was

It

in 1983

State's

plaintiffs.
A

-

In the leading case of Driggs v. Utah State Teachers
Retirement Board, 142 P.2d 657, 105 Utah 417 (1943), the Utah
Supreme Court recognized that pension benefits are more than
mere gratuitous allowances.

Pension programs are an inducement

to continued public service and create a contractual relationship between the state and the pensioner.
660-662.

Thus, when the pensioner

-11-

Driggs, 142 P.2d at

accepts the offer of the

state

by

satisfying

bound

to perform

all

the

conditions precedent, the

contract

on the

terms

existing at the time the contract is formed.
at

662-664;

Newcomb

v.

Ogden

Retirement Comm1 n, 243 P.2d

City

Public

and

state is
conditions

Driggs, 142 P.2d
School

941, 947 (Utah 1952).

conditions precedent are satisfied, the pensioner

Teachers
Once all

acquires a

vested right to his pension on the terms and conditions then
existing, which right may not be altered by subsequent legislation.

Id.
It was precisely for that reason that the state in

Driggs was not able to alter the amount of plaintiff's pension
after

plaintiff

determined

had

Driggs1

retired.

pension

rights

were

in accordance with the statutes in effect at the

time of his retirement.

Driggs is squarely on point and is

controlling in the instant case.

Likewise, in Newcomb, supra,

the state was not free to unilaterally permit cancellation of
its pension contract with plaintiff.
Application of these very basic principles of contract
and constitutional law produce a similar result here.

Plain-

tiffs are entitled to have their contract enforced under the
terms and conditions existing at the time they withdrew fro^
the

Retirement

System.

The

provision

permitting

continued

employment is more than a mere gratuitous benefit, as characterized by defendants.

Quite to the contrary, that provision

-12-

is an integral part of the contract and it induced plaintiffs
to withdraw from the system rather than continue to accumulate
service credit and contributions,

As in Priggs and Newcomb,

defendants are not free to unilaterally change the terms of
their agreement.
B.

The Legislative History Of The 1983 Amendment Does Not
Entitle Defendants To Unilaterally
Alter Vested
Contract Rights.
Defendants contend that the Legislature did not intend

the result produced by the 1983 Amendment.
8).

(App. Brief at p.

In support of this argument, defendants introduced into

evidence the House debate on the 1983 Amendment (R182-183).
essence, defendants are attempting
Amendment

as curative

however, that
rights.

even

legislation.

curative

to characterize
It

is well

statutes may

not

In

the 1985

established,
impair

vested

Davis v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 476 P.2d 635 (Kan.

1970); Addison v. Fleenor, 196 P.2d 991 (Wyo. 1948); 2 Sands,
Sutherland Statutory Construction

§§ 41.11 and 41.12

(3d Ed.

1973); 82 C.J.S., Statute § 430 (1953); 73 Am.Jur.2d, Statutes
§ 353 (1974).

Thus, even if viewed as an attempt to cure an

alleged defect, the 1985 Amendment may not divest plaintiffs of
their vested contract rights.
Defendants' reliance on the legislative history of the
1983 Amendment is unavailing here for other reasons as well.
It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that

-13-

extrinsic aids should not be used to construe a statute absent
an ambiguity in the language of the statute itself.

United

States v. Richards, 583 F.2d 491, 495 (10th Cir. 1978); Cal.
Teachers Ass'n. v. San Diego Com, College, 170 Cal. Rptr. 817,
621 P.2d 856, 859 (Cal. 1981).

Defendants did not satisfy this
4
basic prerequisite to consideration of legislative history.
It also is widely recognized that legislative debates
are suspect in determining legislative intent.

It is often the

case that those who did not express a view on the legislation
did not necessarily agree with those who did speak in favor of
its

passage.

2A

Singer,

Sutherland

§ 48.13 at p. 329 (4th ed. 1984).
on

the

House

debate

persuasive, since
intent

involving

this debate

to limit application

Statutory

Construction

Thus, defendants' reliance

the

1983

does not

Amendment

clearly

of the amendment

is

not

indicate an

to only those

public safety officials who changed jobs rather than those who
remained

in their

jobs.

There

is simply

no guarantee that

members of the House who voted in favor of this legislation

4

Significantly, defendants did not introduce any legislative debates with respect to the 1985 Amendment. It is therefore impossible for this Court to determine whether, in fact,
the Legislature actually believed that the 1983 Amendment had
been misconstrued by the Retirement Board. The 1985 Amendment
may simply be construed as a change in policy rather than an
attempt to correct an erroneous interpretation of the earlier
amendment.
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perceived

the

same

limitation

upon

it

that

defendants

now

contend those who spoke in favor of it intended.
C.

The 1983 Amendment Does Not
Other Provisions Of Title 49.
It

is equally

unavailing

Repeal

to suggest

By

Implication

that

the 1983

Amendment repealed by implication other pension statutes set
forth in Title 49.

(Appellant's Brief at pp. 8-9).

defendants' argument overlooks the underlying

Again,

principle that

vested rights may not be impaired by subsequent legislation,
even where that

legislation

is intended

to cure an alleged

error in the interpretation of an earlier statute.
Even if this basic principal were not applicable here,
defendant's argument lacks merit.

The Act itself states, in

pertinent part, as follows:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of
the legislature that this act be liberally

D

The case of Gallegos v. Midvale City, 492 P.2d 1335
(Utah 1972), cited by Defendants, does not compel a different
result. That case involved an apparent conflict between the
statutory notice provisions pertaining to actions against
municipalities and the tolling rules applied to claims of
minors. Although the Gallegos court noted that a court may
correct an erroneous judicial interpretation of a statute, the
court refused to do so in that case because of the doctrine of
stare decisis, stating that the law should be changed only when
there has been a plain and obvious error. Moreover, Gallegos
does not stand for the proposition that a court may reinterpret
a statute so as to divest rights that have vested under a prior
interpretation.
^These statutes have been set forth in
heading "Statutes Subject to Interpretation."
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full

under

the

construed so that the benefit and protections as herein provided shall be extended
as broadly as reasonably possible.
Utah Code Ann, S 49-11-9 (1981).

This section merely codified

the common law rule that pension statutes are to be liberally
construed

in favor

Teacher's

Retirement

Board,

omitted].

Thus,

[citations
construed

of the pensioner.

Driggs v. Utah State

142 P.2d
the

657, 663

1983

(Utah

Amendment

1943)

should

be

liberally to afford the broadest possible coverage

and be interpreted as consistent with other pension statutes.
In addition, defendants concede that where laws are
subject to more than one interpretation, one of which requires
repeal by implication of other laws, the basic rules of statutory

construction

require

gives effect to all laws.

a reading

that

avoids

App. Brief at p. 9.

repeal and

Although defen-

dants are willing to apply this principle to the 1985 amendment
so as to avoid

repeal by

implication

with

respect

to that

amendment, defendants apparently are unwilling to give the same
deference to the 1983 amendment notwithstanding
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insignificant

differences between the two amendments as they apply to the
7
other pension statutes set forth in Title 49.
D.

The Court's Ruling Below Is Consistent
Results Reached In Similar Cases.

With

The

The result reached by the trial court is hardly novel,
either here in Utah or elsewhere.

The case of State Ex ReL

McClean v. Retirement Board, Public Employees Retirement Fund,

defendants contend that Utah Code Ann. §§ 49-11-8(30);
49-11-34; and 49-11-37 are repealed by implication by the 1983
Amendment. A brief review of those statutes clearly shows,
however, that if the 1983 Amendment, as applied to plaintiffs,
repeals those provisions, then the 1985 Amendment must have the
same effect. The fact that one amendment permits the pensioner
to remain in the same job while the other permits the pensioner
to hold an identical position with a different employer, but in
the same retirement system, is a "distinction without a
difference" as far as the other Title 49 provisions are
concerned.
The definition of "service" envisions service which is
included in computations relating to membership status or benefit rights under the Act, Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-8(19). Since
plaintiffs' continued employment is not included in computations relating to membership status or benefit rights under the
Act, their continued employment is not deemed service for
purposes of Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-8(30). Similarly, because
plaintiffs have not been "re-employed," their continued service
does not violate Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-37. In fact, 'public
safety officers who withdraw from the system pursuant * to the
1985 Amendment more likely violate Section 49-11-37 than do
plaintiffs since they must terminate their present jobs and
start employment with a different covered unit within the same
system to enjoy the benefits of Section 49-11-1. However, the
term "re-employment" is not expressly defined and, in any
event, it is clear that re-employment, like the definition of
"service," contemplates service that is included in computations relating to membership status or benefits. Thus, neither
amendment repeals by implication Section 49-11-37 or any other
provision of Title 49, Chapter 11, because plaintiffs are not
accumulating further service credits.
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119 N.E.2d 70 (Ohio 1954), is almost directly on point as it
involves

working

while

drawing

retirement

benefits.

in

McClean, plaintiff was employed as a municipal clerk for more
than 30 years before retiring in February of 1945.

As a member

of the Ohio Public Retirement System, plaintiff was granted a
disability

retirement

allowance

effective

April lf

1945,

pursuant to the provisions of the State statutes then in force.
From April of 1949 to March of 1952, plaintiff was
employed by a different municipality.

The defendant Retirement

Board removed plaintiff from the pension rolls because of this
employment and demanded that plaintiff reimburse the amount of
pension he drew for the period of his employment.

The Retire-

ment Board relied on a 1947 Ohio statute, passed after plaintiff

had

retired,

forbidding

someone

from

being

gainfully

employed while drawing a disability retirement allowance.
Although

the

Court

disagreed

with

the

Board's

construction of the 1947 amendment, it held that even if the
amendment did forbid simultaneous enjoyment of employment and
pension benefits, it could not constitutionally be applied to
plaintiff.

In this regard, the Court stated as follows:

Undoubtedly, the general assembly intended
to restrict to some extent the right of a
disabled employee to draw disability retirement
allowance
while
being
otherwise
employed, but, it is well settled that the
general assembly could not, by legislation
passed in 1947, deny an employee right to
compensation which had already vested. The
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realtor was retired February 15, 1945, on
account of disability.
His rights were
vested as of that date in accordance with
the
statute
then
in
force.
[Statutory
references
omitted].
Neither
of
those
sections contained any provision restricting
the right of employment of one receiving
disability retirement allowance.
Inasmuch
as the rights of the realtor to disability
retirement allowance which had vested on or
prior to February 15, 1945 could not be
denied or restricted by subsequent legislation, [citation omitted], it is unnecessary
to discuss
the probable
effect
of the
above-quoted
revision
of Section 486-63,
General Code, which became effective June 5,
1947,
with
respect
to
those
granted
disability retirement allowance subsequent
to that date.
•

*

*

It is our conclusion that the right of
realtor to disability retirement allowance
was vested in February 1945 in accordance
with the statute then in force; and that
under those statutes, the realtor had the
legal right to draw the disability retirement
allowance
during
the
period
from
April 1, 1949
to March
1, 1952
(which
concededly amounted to $2,860.20), and at
the same time be gainfully employed by the
City of Miami.
Id. at 71-72

[emphasis

supplied].

Similarly, plaintiffs

here

have a vested right to their retirement benefits regardless of
their

continued

employer
Retirement
continued

units.

employment
At

the

with

time

their

respective

plaintiffs

withdrew

and,

by

contract,

they

receive retirement benefits while continuing
Just as in McClean, supra, the statute
was

enacted

vested.

from

System, there was no restriction on their
employment

after

Defendants

plaintiffs1
would

their

those

rights
vested

the

right to

allowed

to

employment.

restricting

contract

impair

were

covered

employment

already
rights

had
by

imposing a condition on their enjoyment that was not part of
the bargain on which plaintiffs relied in withdrawing from the
system.

See

also

Board, 445 A.2d

Bellomini

737

v.

State

Employees'

(Pa. 1982) [retirement

board

Retirement
could not

deprive plaintiffs of vested pension benefits on the basis of a
subsequently
employees

enacted

convicted

statute

terminating

of crimes

relating

benefits

of public

to public

office or

public employment].
II.
DEFENDANTS HAVE NOT OFFERED PLAINTIFFS A
SUBSTANTIAL SUBSTITUTE FOR RETIREMENT BENEFITS AND CONTINUED EMPLOYMENT.
Defendants

correctly

rights are not absolutely

point

protected

out

that

under

vested

all

pension

circumstances

o

(Appellant's

Brief

at p.

12).

Defendants

also

recognize,

however, that before vested rights may be significantly

^Defendants' reliance on very broad yet unarticulated
"public policy" considerations is surprising, especially since
defendants apparently requested no further consideration or
clarification from the Legislature before implementing the 1983
Amendment. (See App. Brief at pp. 12-13). The public policy
of this state is determined by the state legislature, not by
the Retirement Board. The Retirement Board is obligated to
implement legislative enactments regardless of whether it
agrees or disagrees with the policy considerations underlying
those enactments. The Retirement Board discharged this duty by
applying the 1983 Amendment in the manner in which it was
written by the state legislature. The Retirement Board is not
free to now re-evaluate public policy considerations and breach
the State's contract with plaintiffs.
The Retirement Board's "outrage" is even more curious
given its endorsement of the 1985 Amendment. That amendment
still enables a sheriff or police chief to withdraw from the
public safety retirement system and continue employment within

altered,

the

Newcomb

v.

state
Ogden

must

provide

a

"substantial

City

Public

School

substitute."

Teachers1

Retirement

Common, 243 P.2d 941, 946-948.
Defendants have not given plaintiffs here a "substantial substitute."
Hobson's

choice

employment,

not

What defendants have given plaintiffs
between
a

substitute

continued

employment—to

the

Amendment.

1983

offering

plaintiffs

retirement

In

which
other

a choice

for

benefits
retirement

plaintiffs
words,

that

are

or

continued

benefits
entitled

Defendants

plaintiffs

is a

are

and
under

merely

could

have made
9
without the benefit of either the 1983 or 1985 Amendments.

0

Cont'd,
the same system. Although the sheriff or police chief is not
permitted to retain the same job, there is no requirement that
he accept employment in a designated need area to prevent out
of state public safety personnel from filling jobs in the
public safety sector that would otherwise go to qualified
Utahns.
To illustrate, even under the 1985 Amendment, the
police chiefs of Midvale and Murray could simply switch jobs,
begin to receive retirement benefits and draw salary from their
new employment.
Certainly this inducement, and the arbitrary
classifications drawn by the statute, do not enhan'ce the
quality of police protection in this state or necessarily
prevent out-of-state public safety personnel
from filling
similar positions in the so-called need areas of Utah. It is
difficult to discern a legitimate basis on which to condemn the
1983 Amendment on public policy grounds while condoning the
results that may be reached under the 1985 Amendment.
It also
is inappropriate for defendants1 counsel to make allegations of
so-called "triple dipping" that are not supported in the record
below and which are completely irrelevant to this appeal.
(App. Brief at p. 13).
^Defendants have conceded that the actuarial soundness of
the pension system has not been significantly affected by
plaintiffs1 exercise of their rights under the 1983 Amendment.

Defendants' characterization of the 1985 Amendment as
a

procedural

genuous.

rather

than

The case of

Services,

663

P.2d

a

substantive

Pilcher

450

v. State

(Utah

1983),

amendment

is

disin-

Department

of

Social

cited

by

defendants,

involved a procedural change in the recovery of existing child
support obligations.
of

Pilcher

rights.

are

Obviously, the purely procedural remedies

readily

distinguishable

from

vested

contract

The right of plaintiffs to retire from the system and

continue their present employment is a substantive rather than
procedural

right

and

may

not

be

impaired

by

a

subsequent

amendment.
Okland Constr. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 520 P.2d
(Utah

1974),

dictum

from

authority,

did

unpersuasive.

that

case,

the

effect

to

retroactively
Okland

is also

to

not

clarify
involve

Defendants

unsupported
that
or

an

any

amendment

amplify

impairment

by

an
of

rely

may

earlier
vested

on

other

208
mere

cited

be

applied

law.

Again,

rights

and

the

amendment at issue here goes well beyond mere clarification of
existing

law.

As noted above, even curative statutes may not

be applied to impair vested rights.

(See Respondents' Brief at

p. 13).
Finally,
pension benefits

defendants

admit

is inviolate.

that

plaintiffs'

(App. Brief

right

at p. 15).

to

What

defendants ignore, however, is plaintiffs' right to enjoy those

-22-

benefits on the terms and conditions existing at the time they
were

permitted

to withdraw

from

terms under which a pensioner
significant
lated.

as the method

To suggest that

the

may

Retirement

System.

The

receive benefits may be as

by which

those benefits

the method

are calcu-

of calculation may not be

changed by the state, but the terms under which

the benefits

may

legislation,

be

enjoyed

may

be

changed

by

subsequent

ignores the very basis of the bargain struck between the State
and plaintiffs.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs

and

defendants

entered

into

a

executory contract at the time plaintiffs elected
from the Retirement
ment.

Plaintiffs1

System and continue
pension

rights

to withdraw

their present

vested

on

binding

the

employ-

terms

and

conditions existing at that time and, as in McClean, there was
no restriction on plaintiffs' continued employment

at the time

the

retirements.

Retirement

Board

approved

their

Accordingly, the State may not alter
tiffs by unilaterally

imposing

respective

its contract with plain-

new conditions on enjoyment

of

plaintiffs1 vested rights.
The

legislative

history

of

the

1983

Amendment

is

irrelevant to whether a contract was formed between plaintiffs
and

defendants.

clusive and there

Moreover,

the

legislative

is no evidence
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that the

history

is

incon-

1985 Amendment

was

intended to cure an alleged defect in the interpretation of the
1983 Amendment.

More importantly, it is well recognized that a

curative statute may not impair vested rights, such as plaintiffs' contract rights here.
Although
circumstances,

vested

rights

defendants

have

are

not

conceded

absolute
that

the

under

all

actuarial

soundness of the pension system is not jeopardized by application of the 1983 Amendment to plaintiffs.

Moreover, even were

defendants permitted to provide a "substantial substitute" for
plaintiffs1 right to retirement benefits and continued employment,

no

such

substitute

has

been

offered

here.

To

the

contrary, defendants have offered plaintiffs a Hobson's choice
in breach of their contractual obligations.
This case is controlled by Driggs and its progeny and
Respondents

respectfully

request

that

the

judgment

below be

affirmed and that Respondents be awarded their costs.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this fft^day of November, 1985.
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